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Introduction 
The analysis of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their role on financial 
markets is crucial nowadays, when their central role in the current financial crisis has 
put them in the eye of the storm. Credit rating may act as a mechanism for addressing 
the considerable degree of information asymmetry in the financial markets. The 
information content hypothesis (ICH) states that rating agencies handle confidential 
data and therefore, rating revisions reveal new information to the market. Under the 
efficient market paradigm, this new information must be rapidly included into prices. 
However, credit ratings can be valuable to investors although they do not contain 
valuable information, due to the regulatory privileges that they provide (Weber and 
Darbellay, 2008; Bongaerts, Cremers and Goetzmann, 2012). 
 A number of studies have analyzed ICH, most of which focusing on the stock 
market. The main conclusion is that returns are influenced by bond rating changes, 
especially by downgrades (e.g., Matolcy and Lianto, 1995; Barron, Clare and Thomas, 
1997; Elayan, Hsu and Meyer, 2001; Abad and Robles, 2006, 2007; Purda, 2007 or 
Jorion and Zhang, 2007). Few studies show evidence concerning the effects of rating 
changes on issuer’s risks (Impson, Karafiath and Glascock, 1992; Chandra and Nayar, 
1998; Barron et al., 1997; Abad and Robles, 2006, 2014; Hubler, Louargant, Ory and 
Raimbourg, 2013). In both cases, the results demonstrate the importance of rating 
change announcements in revealing specific information that is relevant to price 
formation.  
This literature establishes the expected effect of rating changes on returns and 
on beta risk individually, disregarding the joint reaction of the risk-return binomial. 
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However, under the hypothesis that investor are risk-averse, there is a risk-return 
tradeoff that may be taken into account in order to determine the information content 
of rating events. Our main objective is to fill in that gap by analyzing the ICH 
considering the combined response of expected returns and both risks to different 
rating actions announced by CRAs. We focus on finding the main factors to signal 
which announcements are informative. Instead the traditional event-study plus a cross 
sectional analysis usual in the literature, we examine the impact on the probability 
that a rating announcement convey new information. As the informational content of 
these credit announcements is largely unobservable, we use the fact that the abnormal 
behavior of risk and returns around the announcement date should be significant. We 
estimate a logit model that relates the likelihood of occurrence or non-occurrence of an 
informative credit rating announcement to a vector of explanatory variables. We focus 
on the characteristics of the returns, the volatility, the rating change, the agency, the 
issuer and the economic environment as explanatory variables or factors that 
determine these probabilities. We also analyze the effect of the ongoing financial crisis. 
We analyze the rating announcement of Spanish companies listed on the 
Electronic Continuous Stock Market from 2000 to 2010. The Spanish stock exchange is 
a medium-sized market that plays a relevant role among the different stock exchanges 
in Europe. According to the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (IFSE), the 
relative size of the Spanish Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization is 
approximately 10% of the size of the NYSE in 2010. We use rating announcement by 
the “Big Three” rating agencies. 
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Our study makes a number of relevant contributions. First, instead of an 
aggregate analysis based on a traditional two-step event study, we propose a binomial 
logistic model to analyze the relationship between rating announcement and the 
risk/returns binomial. Second, we characterize the main factors that determine the 
simultaneous response in returns and risk. Third, we explore the incidence of the 
current financial turmoil.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find different effects 
of improvements and deteriorations announcements on informational contained. 
Interestingly, there are more characteristics relevant regard the ICH in the 
improvements announcement than deteriorations. Second, the main attributes of rating 
events relevant to explain the response of systematic risk differs from those relevant to 
explain the response of returns. Finally, our results suggest a loss of reputation of 
CRAs in the later financial turmoil. After the crisis beginning, positive and negative 
credit rating announcement disclose less relevant information. The relevance of this 
analyze is twofold. First, it helps to fills a gap in the literature on the relationship 
between rating actions and returns and beta risk. Second, our results can help market 
participants to make effective investment decisions based on the risk-return profile. 
The investor can identify the main factors in the rating announcement and know how 
risk-return binomial change.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main hypothesis 
regarding the factors that determine the informational announcement. Section 3 shows 
the methodology. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 5 the main results and 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Main Hypothesis to test 
In order to identify rating changes as a major source of credit news, market 
participants must check whether an announcement contains new information or 
whether credit news is already fully incorporated into prices. We assume that in the 
latter case the impact of the announcement is going to be zero whereas in the former 
there will be some abnormal reaction.  
 Our main hypothesis is that this informative content depends on several 
attributes. We select different factors that have been hypothesized by literature to 
determine the market reaction to rating changes. First, we focus on the rating 
refinements: outlooks and reviews. These refinements are introduced by CRAs in 
response to critics on their failure for timely rating changes. Altman and Rijken (2007) 
state that rating refinements help to transfer relevant information about the issuers’ 
default risk allowing agencies to strike a balance between rating timeliness and rating 
stability. In this line, we expect reviews and outlook reports include relevant 
information as effective rating changes do.  
In addition, some authors have found differences in rating actions across the 
three main CRAs. Morgan (2002) shows that Moody's is more conservative than S&P 
when a split occurs. Grande and Parsley (2005) and Norden and Weber (2004) find 
that S&P tends to provide the earliest and the most thorough market assessment. 
Livingston, Wei and Zhou (2010) find Moody’s ratings arouse greater market reactions 
compared to S&P. Conversely, Guettler and Wahrenburg (2007) find that bond ratings 
by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are highly correlated, pointing to no differences 
among agencies. In the case of Spain, Moody’s and S&P began to operate in 1993 and 
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Fitch in 1995, but Moody’s has the dominant position, with 41.4% of rating actions in 
our sample.1 We hypothesize that market gives more credibility to the leading agency, 
due to its expertise that increase the informative content of its rating announcements 
with respect the other CRAs.  
Other attributes that may signal the information content of rating events are 
too related to the agencies. Commonly, issues and issuers can be rated by one, two or 
more agencies simultaneously (multi-rating).2 Multirating increases competence among 
CRAs, and incentive agencies to be more active monitors for certain issuers. This 
monitor activity increases the visibility of the firm to market participants and allows 
investors to anticipate the relevant information before the announcement, making 
them less informative. Our hypothesis, in this context, is that rating actions affecting 
widely covered issues – i.e rated by a higher number of CRAs or with a higher number 
of announcements about their debt– have lower novel information than those affecting 
barely covered issues. 
                                                            
1 There are scarce differences between rating actions by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s in our sample 
in terms of the prior rating and the number of notches the rating changes. We only find small 
differences in the size of the jump looking at upgrades and downgrades separately, proving Moody’s 
slightly more optimistic. 
2 Literature has studied different feature of multirating. We find studies that focus on the relation 
between quality of the rating and the number of ratings. Becker and Milbourn (2011) find that quality 
is inversely related to the number of active rating agencies. Conversely, Peña-Cerezo, Rodríguez-
Castellanos and Ibáñez-Hernández (2013) find that increasing the number of CRAs that rate 
securitization issues increase reliability in the rating achieved by each issue. Xia (2014) finds that the 
introduction of a new agency increases the quality of ratings.  
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On the other hand, multirating frequently underscores differences of opinion 
across the rating agencies. These split ratings seems to be related to differences in the 
methodology or in the weight that CRAs gives to relevant information (Cantor and 
Paker, 1997). It could be expected that disagreements among agencies about the 
solvency of a firm could increase the level of asymmetric information in the market. 
Hence, we hypothesize that the amount of information provided by a rating event 
depends on whether it presents the same opinion about the firm’s default risk as the 
other agencies.  
Some other attributes may cause differences in the attention that market plays 
to rating actions. For example, it is likely that the market does not immediately detect 
when a company’s solvency begins to change. If a continuous decrease (improvement) 
in solvency occurs, agencies will carry out a series of successive downgrade (upgrade) 
announcements regarding the rating of the issuer’s debt. In this situation, it is 
expected that the informational content of each successive rating action will be lower 
than the previous one. As such, our hypothesis is that events included in an issuer’s 
solvency trend would be less informative. 
Additionally, we hypothesize that expected rating events as effective rating 
changes that are the resolution of credit watch procedures, will be less informative. 
Watch listing increases the firm’s visibility and the market expectations of a rating 
change. Conversely, Boot et al. (2006) indicate that reviews probably increase the 
information content of effective changes because it discloses more confidential 
information. Credit watches allow issuers to improve solvency conditions avoiding 
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rating cuts. According to this, the informational content of effective rating changes 
could vary depending on the presence of a previous refinement. 
 Similarly, credit rating agencies assign ratings to corporate issuers, long and 
short term debt, as well as to specific issues, such as notes, and structured finance 
instruments. Sometimes, rating announcements only refers to one of these concepts but 
frequently the rating action refers to several concepts at the same time (multiple 
rating changes). One may expect that the latter case (i.e. when the rating of several 
concepts change simultaneously) be motivated by a greater change in the solvency of 
the issuer. In this sense, we expect that these multiple rating changes be more 
informative. We also consider the possibility that the relevance of this information 
depends on the concept. In particular, issue ratings refer to the creditworthiness of a 
firm with respect to a specific financial obligation, and issuer credit ratings refers to its 
overall creditworthiness to pay its financial obligations. Our hypothesis is that 
announcement about changes in the second would be more informative as issuer rating 
measure the capacity and willingness of firms to meet its financial commitments as a 
whole. 
The characteristics of investors may also indicate when rating actions reveal 
novel information. Jorion and Zhang (2007) find that the prior rating is the most 
important factor explaining the stock returns’ reaction to rating changes. Abad and 
Robles (2014) also find that this factor is relevant to explain the response of beta risk. 
These effects could be related to constraint clauses faced by institutional investors that 
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force them to make decisions based on the observed rating level3 and concentrate their 
activity mainly in the investment-grade level.4 In this context, we expect to find 
differences in the informative content of events that depend on the prior rating. These 
institutional rigidities can also result in stronger reaction to rating changes that cross 
the investment-grade frontier.  
Furthermore, we can understand the number of notches the rating change as 
the degree of variation in credit quality of the issuer perceived by the agency. Our 
hypothesis is that bigger sizes of jump are directly related to the information about 
issuer solvency that the announcement reveals. Nevertheless, rating users are investors 
while agency revenues are paid by the rated firms. As Covitz and Harrison (2003) 
point out, this situation underscores a conflict of interest. Agencies may act in favor of 
issuers by delaying the release of downgrades and giving the issuer time to correct its 
credit quality. We expect that market participants could anticipate the information in 
the case of firms suffering a large change in their default risk. In this situation the 
delay of the agency could be greater. Agencies may require extra time in the case of 
large improvements because of the possible loss of reputation related with the 
bankruptcy of a highly rated business.5 In this case, we can find a negative relation 
between the informative content and the degree to which the rating is changed. 
                                                            
3  For example, pension funds are often allowed to deal only with investment-grade issues. Similarly, 
certain markets, such as the Eurobond market, may simply require the presence of a particular 
minimum rating before listing the debt issue. 
4 Most of bonds in our sample are in the investment grade with only 13 in the speculative grade. 
5  Recall the fall of Enron in 2001 or that of Lehman Brothers in 2008 for example. 
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Several characteristics of the re-rated firms have been studied as relevant factors 
to explain the market reaction to rating events. Differences in the regulation affecting 
firms can lead on differences in the information content of rating changes (Schweitzer, 
Szewczyk and Varma, 1992). For highly regulated sectors, such as financial or energy 
sectors, there is probably more public information. In addition, these entities are in 
most cases supported in some extent by the state.6 A big proportion of issuers in our 
sample are financial enterprises, mainly commercial banks. The well-known “too-big-
to-fail” paradigm suggests that regulators might intervene to avoid the default of large 
banks because of serious, adverse effects on the financial system.7 In this context, 
market participants may be insensitive to rating actions affecting systemic banks. This 
hypothesis implies lower useful information on rating changes affecting firms in highly 
regulated sectors than in other sectors.  
Finally, the sample period we analyze covers the recent economic recession, 
originated by the housing bubble burst in September 2007 and reinforced in 2008 after 
the Lehman Brothers default. This period has been characterized by a more uncertain 
informational environment and high levels of volatility. Several authors find significant 
differences in rating action effects due to the crisis. For example, Jorion, Liu and Shi 
                                                            
6 For example, in Spain, power prices are regulated and the state bore the liability for the gap between 
regulated power prices and higher generation costs.  
7 Major financial firms are assumed to be “too big to fail”. Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail on 
September 15, 2008. However, numerous interventions by governments or central banks have taken 
place since then to avoid banks defaults. Several examples include Fortis (Belgium, Netherland and 
Luxemburg, 2008), Dexia (France and Belgium, 2008), Bradford & Bingley (United Kingdom, 2008) 
and Caja Madrid (Spain, 2010).  
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(2005) find less negative effects of downgrades on stock returns during the 2001 stock 
market crisis, and May (2010) finds a more negative reaction to downgrades in the US 
corporate bond market after 2007. We expect this increased uncertainty after the crisis 
began to cause higher levels of informational asymmetries, leading to higher 
information content of rating actions. Another important effect of the financial turmoil 
is the loss of rating agencies’ credibility due to their central role in the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis or their failure to predict the Lehman Brothers default in 2008.8 This 
loss of reputation should undermine the reliability of rating actions after the crisis. 
 
3. Modeling and testing strategy 
We are interested in analyze if several attributes of rating actions are the 
underlying determinants of the existence of valuable information in the rating 
announcement to explain the risk-return binomial of the re-rated firm. To do so, we 
analyze the probability that these rating announcements reveal relevant information. 
As their informational content is largely unobservable, we use as proxy a dummy 
variable that is equal to one when we observe a significant movement in risk-return 
binomial in the expected direction and zero otherwise. Then, we model a binomial logit 
model (BLM) that relates the likelihood of occurrence or non-occurrence of an 
informative credit rating action to a vector of explanatory variables. BLM is a popular 
approach to estimate the probabilities associated with events captured in a 
                                                            
8  See Crouchy et al. (2008) for an analysis of the role played by rating agencies in the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
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dichotomous variable. The probability of new information in the rating announcement 
is given by 
 
'
'
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1 exp( )
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b= = +

  (1) 
 
where the vector 'tx  includes the explanatory variables plus a constant and β  is a 
vector of coefficients.  When iβ is significant, then the variable ix has an effect upon 
the probability of informative rating announcement. The model is estimated using 
maximum likelihood and goodness-of-fit is measured using the pseudo-R2 approach of 
McFadden (1974) and the percentage of accurate predictions by the model. 
Additionally, we compute the average partial effects – the average of the effect of an 
unit change of one independent variable on the probability, given that all other 
variables are constant– to assess the economic significance of this change.9 
 We consider several explanatory variables that allow testing the hypothesis 
described in Section 2. We focus on the characteristics of the returns, the volatility, 
the rating change, the agency, the issuer and the economic environment as explanatory 
variables or factors that determine these probabilities. In particular, to distinguish 
between effective rating changes and rating refinements we define two dummy 
variables, Review and Outlook report, equal to one if the rating action is a watchlisting 
or an outlook review respectively and zero otherwise.  
                                                            
9 Average marginal effect is the average (over all observation) of partial derivatives of probabilities with 
respect to the vector of independent variables. 
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To analyze the relevance of the agency, we define other two dummy variables, 
Moody’s and S&P, equal to one if the rating action is announced by Moody’s or S&P 
respectively and zero otherwise.  
 To study the incidence of multi-rating we include several variables. First, the 
variables, Two agencies and Three agencies, that take the value of 1 if the issuer is 
rated by two or three CRAs respectively. Second, we include other two variables that 
may also proxy the degree of visibility of the firm. Highly covered (Barely covered) is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is in the first (fourth) quartile of issuer 
ranking with regards to the number of rating actions in the sample.  
With respect to the agreement or disagreement among agencies, we include 
three variables: Simultaneous, that is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating 
action has been announced by two or more agencies the same day and zero otherwise, 
Split-rating, that is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action follows an 
action by other agency in the opposite direction in the preceding 3 months and zero 
otherwise, and Second mover, that is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating 
action follows an action by other agency in the same direction in the preceding 3 
months and zero otherwise.  
We also include in the model variables that proxy whether a rating action is 
expected by the market or whether is a surprise. Trend rating is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the rating action has been preceded by one rating announcements in the 
same direction over the past 24 months and zero otherwise. Break trend is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the rating action has been preceded by two rating 
announcements in the opposite direction and zero otherwise. We also include the 
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variable Expected, that is equal to one if the rating action has been preceded by a 
watchlisting or review and zero otherwise.  
 We proxy the “intensity” of the change in the solvency of the firm considering 
whether the rating refers to different concepts or not and the type of concepts affected. 
We define Multiple as a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action refers to 
several concepts at the same time, and the variable Issuer, as a dummy variable equal 
to one if the rating event refers to the issuer credit rating.  
To consider differences related to the rating grade we include in the model the 
variables: Prior rating, that is a variable encoding the grades of the previous rating 
before the announcement, assigning value 1 to AAA/Aaa, 2 to AA/Aa, 3 to A/A, 4 to 
BBB/Bbb, … and 10 to D/C, Jump that is a variable equal to the number of notches 
between the prior rating and new rating and Speculative that is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the prior rating of the firm is on speculative level and zero otherwise. 
We also consider in the model the sector in which the firm operates. Financial 
(Energy) is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action involves Financial (Oil-
Energy) sector firms and zero otherwise.  
To test if the financial turmoil has affected the informative content of rating 
events, we include in the model two variables. Financial crisis is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the event occurs after September, 15 2008 and zero otherwise. Volatility 
is the stock market volatility10 over stock issuer volatility in the event window.  
                                                            
10 We compute the stock market volatility by estimating a GARCH(1,1) model for the Spanish stock 
market returns measured from the IBEX 35 index. 
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3.1. Probability of informative rating change 
In order to proxy the probability of informative rating event, we estimate the 
responses of stock risk and returns to rating actions. Following Abad and Robles 
(2014) we estimate the following model: 
 
it i i mt si s si st mt it
R R D D Ra b g l e= + + + + , (2) 
where itR  is the return
11 on stock i at time t from day -250 to day +1 (t = 0 is the 
announcement date); mtR  is the return on the market index at time t, which we 
calculate using an equal weight index; stD is a dummy variable taking on the value of 
one for the days in the event window (-1, +1) and zero otherwise. 
In expression (1), ia is the average daily amount by which the stock 
outperforms the benchmark portfolio on days -250 through -1 and i sia g+  is the 
average daily amount by which the stock outperforms the benchmark portfolio in the 
event window. Similarly, ib  is the stock’s beta with respect to the benchmark portfolio 
on days -250 through -1 and i s ib l+  is the stock’s beta with respect to the benchmark 
portfolio on days -1 through +1. Finally, ite  is an i.i.d. zero mean error term.  
We can write the variance of returns according to model (1) as follows: 
 
2var( ) var( ) var( )
it i mt it
R Rd e= + , (3) 
where id  is i sib l+  in the event (-1, +1) and ib  on days -250 through -1. Equation 
(2) shows the total risk of asset i can be partitioned into two parts: the systematic 
                                                            
11 Returns are computed as
1
100it itit
it
P d
R Ln
P -
+æ ö÷ç= ÷ç ÷è ø , where itP  is the closing price of the stock i on day t, 
corrected for stock splits, equity offerings and merger effects, and itd  is the dividend announced on day 
t. The source of data is the Spanish Electronic Continuous Stock Market. 
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risk, 2 var( )i mtRd , which is a measure of how the asset covaries with the economy and 
the idiosyncratic risk, var( )ite , which is independent of the economy.  
As Abad and Robles (2014) and Hubler et al. (2013) have shown, rating events 
can also impact on the idiosyncratic risk of the re-rated firm. We comprise this 
possibility by modeling var( )ite  in the return model (2) as a GJR-GARCH process as 
follows: 
 2 2
0 1 2 3
1 1 1
var( )
,
it it
Q QP
it i iq it q ip it p iq t p it q si st
q p q
h
h h S D
e
w w e w w e f-- - - -
= = =
=
= + + + +å å å  (4) 
where stD  is the event-window dummy defined above. If rating changes add new 
information about the idiosyncratic risk of the company, then 0sif ¹ .  
This model (expressions (2) to (4)) allows analyzing the effect of the 
announcement of credit rating on the stocks of the re-rated firm considering jointly the 
impact on expected returns and on the two components of risk (systematic and 
idiosyncratic). The hypothesis that a credit rating announcement conveys new 
information about the firm implies that 0sig ¹  and/or 0sil ¹  and/or 0sif ¹ .  
In order to compute and to test the significance of the responses of stock risks 
and returns ( , and
si si si
g l f ), the above model is estimated for each rating event in the 
sample. We apply the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator proposed by Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992). QMLE gives generally consistent estimators that have an 
asymptotic normal distribution, and provides asymptotic standard errors robust to 
non-normality.  
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From the estimation results, we classify each rating event as informative or non-
informative according to the significance of the relevant parameters, , and
si si si
g l f . For 
logit model, we define four dummy variables that proxy the informative content. With 
regards to the risk-return binomial, the first is equal to 1 if there are significant 
movements in risk-return binomial in the expected direction ( , and
si si si
g l f  significantly 
different from zero) and equal to 0 otherwise. With regards to beta risk-return 
binomial, the second is equal to 1 if there are significant movements in beta and return 
in the expected direction ( and
si si
g l  significantly different from zero) and equal to 0 
otherwise. Finally, we consider separately the effects on systematic risk and on returns. 
The third dummy variable is equal to 1 if there is a significant movement in beta risk 
( sil significantly different from zero) and equal to 0 otherwise, and the fourth is equal 
to 1 when there is a significant movement in returns ( sig significantly different from 
zero) and equal to 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Data and preliminary analysis 
We analyze three different rating actions: effective rating changes, rating 
reviews and outlook reports12 affecting the long-term debt of 38 firms listed in the 
                                                            
12  Rating agencies adds the debt of a firm to the watch list commonly after special events (e.g., changes 
in regulation, merger announcements, etc.), indicating a likely rating change within a short period of 
time. Outlooks indicate the creditworthiness trend in a medium-term timeframe. 
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Spanish Stock Market from January 2000 to December 2010.13 We consider rating 
actions announced by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.14 
Taking into consideration the direction of the credit announcement, we group 
them into six different categories: effective upgrades, effective downgrades, review for 
upgrades, review for downgrades, and positive outlook reports and negative outlook 
reports.15 Previous information is used to distinguish between contaminated and 
uncontaminated rating events. Following Jorion and Zang (2007), a rating change is 
contaminated if any firm-specific event that may cause abnormal behavior, such as 
earning announcements, mergers and acquisitions or dividend payments, occurs during 
the 5 trading days around the announcement. The uncontaminated sample contains 
292 rating actions, of which 201 are negatives and 91 are positives. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 presents the sample description. Panel A shows the distribution of 
rating actions per year and type (improvement/positive or deterioration/negative). 
The yearly number of negative rating changes increases during crisis periods: the dot-
com bubble burst in 2001-2002 and the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The temporal 
                                                            
13 This cover around 30% of firms in the Spanish Stock Market and the great majority are in the first 
quartile of capitalization. 
14 Fitch and Moody’s provide us with their announcement dates. We also examine Reuters’ publications 
and the economic press to find the rating announcement dates of S&P and other additional 
information.. 
15 Upgrades and downgrades are sometimes accompanied by other rating refinement (outlook changes 
and/or review process). We classify these multiple rating actions as effective rating changes excluding 
them from the outlook or review sample. 
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behavior of upgrades is the opposite, with a notable reduction of the number of 
improvements in credit quality en the last three years. These patterns reflect the 
general deterioration in economic conditions.  
Panel B presents the distribution by type of rating action and per agency. 
Moody’s released 44.9% of the rating actions, Fitch released 28.1%, and the remaining 
27% were released by S&P. We have 100 downgrades, 101 negative refinements (30 
outlook reports and 71 watchlistings), 49 upgrades and 42 positive refinements (33 
outlook reports and 9 watchlistings). Panel C shows the distribution according to the 
rating prior the announcement. The most of cases rating announcements affect firms in 
the investment grade. Finally, Panel D presents the number of rating actions by sector 
of the issuer. The majority of rating actions affect the financial sector (40.4%).  12 of 
33 firms in the sample are financial firms (mainly commercial banks and insurers). The 
energy sector accounts for the second-most rating changes (30.2% of the total changes 
affecting 12 energy firms).  
 
5. Main results 
We report separately results for the baseline sample of deteriorations (Table 2) 
and for improvements (Table 3) in credit quality. We estimate four different binomial 
models in which the dichotomous variable that proxy the probability of occurrence of 
an informative rating action is computed considering if there are: (i) significant 
movements in return, systematic and idiosyncratic risk – Model 1 –; (ii) significant 
movements in returns and systematic risk – Model 2 –; (iii) significant movements in 
beta risk – Model 3 –; and (iv) significant movements in returns – Model 4–. For each 
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model we show the parameter estimates jointly to the impact of significant 
explanatory variables on the marginal probability (AME). 
Of the 199 deteriorations rating announcement in the sample, 28 (14.1%) were 
informative rating action attending to binomial risk-return, 31 (15.6%) attending to 
beta risk-return, 77 (38.7%) attending to beta and 57 (28.6%) attending to returns. On 
the other hand, of the 85 improvement rating announcement, 13 (15.3%) were 
informative rating action attending to binomial risk-return and to beta risk-return, i.e. 
Model 1 and Model 2 have the same dichotomous variable pointing that if 
improvement announcements have informative contained about the risk, then they 
have for both risk, 24 (28.2%) attending to beta and 21 (24.7%) attending to returns. 
5.1. Results for deteriorations in credit quality   
 Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients and the average marginal effects to 
analyze the attributes that affect the probability of informative deterioration 
announcements in the fourth estimated models. We report the McFadden pseudo-R2 
statistic as a measure of goodness of the fit and the proportion of outcomes correctly 
predicted. Although the pseudo-R2 is relatively low, the overall percentage of events 
correctly predicted was relatively high. As can be seen, pseudo-R2 ranges from 0.08 
(Model 4) to 0.14 (Model 2), suggesting the relative success of the estimated logit 
regression models in predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample, 
whereas the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted ranges from 72% (Model 4) to 
86% (Model 2).  
[Insert Table 2] 
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The first two columns of Table 2 report results for Model 1. We do not find 
that the informative content of refinements be different than effective downgrades. The 
estimated coefficient for Review and Outlook report are not significant. As Altmant 
and Rijken (2007) state, these refinements transfer relevant information to the market, 
and we find that do it in the same way than effective rating changes. Moody’s and 
S&P are not significant too, indicating that market do not find relevant differences in 
the information revealed by the three agencies in line to Guettler and Wahrenburg 
(2007) results. 
The number CRAs that rate the issuer have a significant impact. Rating actions 
affecting issuers monitored by two agencies are less informative as Two agencies 
variable is negatively related to the probability of informative announcement. The 
marginal decrease in the probability is substantial (-0.13 points of probability). This 
result supports our hypothesis that higher level of monitoring increase visibility of 
firms and reduce the novel information contained by rating announcements. Our other 
proxy for the visibility of the firm (Highly and Barely covered variables) are not 
significant, pointing to no differences in the information content perceived by the 
market related to the frequency of rating actions of the issuer.  
Surprisingly, the variables related to the agreement or disagreement among 
agencies (Simultaneous, Split-rating, and Second mover) are not significant. The 
probability of informative rating event seems to be not affected by whether this event 
presents the same opinion about the issuer default risk as the other agencies or not. 
Neither seems to be relevant to determine this probability that an announcement be 
include or break a solvency trend of the issuer.     
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The likelihood of an informative announcement is related with the concept that 
agencies rated. We find that announcements of rating events affecting the issuer are 
more likely to enclose relevant information than those affecting the issues. As we 
expected, this downgrades related to deteriorations in the capability of issuers to pay 
its financial obligations, seems to disclose more relevant information than downgrades 
affecting specific debt issues. The change in the probability is 0.45 points when the 
announcement is about issuer. The announcement of a multiple rating event (i.e. 
affecting several concepts at time) does not impact on the probability that the event 
be informative.   
We find evidence that the prior rating is a relevant attribute affecting the 
probability of informative events. We observe that for the higher rating level, 
AAA/Aaa, this probability is lower than in the case of prior rating below it. The 
marginal change in probability decreases 0.12 points for these announcements. This 
result is in line to Jorion and Zhang (2007), pointing to weaker information effects for 
rating changes for high-rated firms related to low-rated firms. The activity of 
institutional investors, concentrated on the investment-grade level, could be behind 
this result. Regulation forces them to hold bonds rated in this market segment, making 
them especially concerned with debt that is next the investment/speculative frontier. 
Surprisingly, deteriorations affecting speculative debt do not seem to reveal differential 
information with respect to investment grade announcements. 
As we expect, the number of notches the rating change affects positively the 
likelihood of existence of valuable information in the rating deterioration. The bigger 
the cut in rating level, the higher the probability of informative announcements. The 
23 
 
average marginal effect is 0.10 point of probability, indicating that the jump size is 
relevant to explain this probability.   
The activity sector of the re-rated firm is also an important attribute to 
determine the information content of rating events. Results indicate that when the re-
rated firm is a financial enterprise, usually banks, the likelihood of observing a 
significant response on the risk-return binomial is lower than for re-rated firms in other 
sectors. The magnitude of the partial derivatives is high, -0.13 points of probability. 
This evidence points to “too-big-to-fail” paradigm. This paradigm is especially 
adequate in the Spanish case, because the Spanish authorities had never allowed the 
default of any bank.16  
Finally, although we would expect a relationship between the crisis and the 
informational content probability, we find that the both variables included to proxy 
crisis times (Financial crisis and Volatility) fail to explain the probability of 
informative rating deteriorations. This result indicates that negative announcements 
reveal relevant information in the same way before and after the crisis began. 
As a whole, results for Model 1 indicate that negative issuer rating 
announcement that imply a big cut in the rating note significantly disclose higher 
levels information about returns and risks (systematic and idiosyncratic) of the rerated 
firms. Conversely, announcements affecting financial firms followed by two CRAs and 
                                                            
16 In June 2009 Spanish government initiated a banking bailout and reconstruction program and created 
the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring, (FOBR). The Bank of Spain had intervened struggling 
lenders and FOBR had controlled mergers and acquisitions programs to rescue Spain's failing savings 
banks as Bankia in 2012. 
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with the top rating level are probably the announcement with less relevant information 
to explain the risk-return binomial.   
Results for Model 2, that analyze the probability of rating deteriorations 
containing information about the systematic risk-return binomial, are similar to those 
for Model 1. In this case, there are three additional attributes of the announcement 
that are relevant to explain this probability, i.e. that contain information about beta 
and returns, but no about idiosyncratic risk. Simultaneous announcements (those 
disclosed by two or more agencies the same day) signal to higher probability of 
informative rating event, being the marginal increase in this probability of 0.15 points. 
This result indicates that the consensus view of CRAs about deterioration in 
creditworthiness or a firm incorporates more information with regards beta and return 
to the market.  
In line to our hypothesis, the likelihood of informative rating event is lower for 
downgrades included in a negative trend (i.e. several previous negative rating 
announcements). This result may reflect that the successive deterioration of firm 
creditworthiness increase the visibility of firm to market participants, who could 
anticipate the information before the release of the new rating level. 
We also observe that downgrades preceded by a watch listing or review are less 
informative as Prior refinement variable has a negative impact on the probability of 
occurrence of informative events. This result confirms our hypothesis that expected 
events contains less novel information and it is contrary to Boot et al. (2006) 
statement. According to Altmant and Rijken (2007), the new information about the 
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deterioration in the solvency of the firm was transferred to the market by the previous 
refinements.  
Finally, Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 consider as dependent variable the 
probability of occurrence of an informative rating even measured as significant 
movements in the expected direction in beta risk (Model 3) and as significant 
movements in the expected direction in returns (Model 4).  
In the case of beta risk, the number of significant attributes is lower than in the 
case of Model 1, 2 and 4. We find that only simultaneous negative announcements 
significantly disclose higher levels information about systematic risk whereas those 
affecting speculative-grade firms, followed by two CRAs, disclose lower levels of 
relevant information. Additionally, the announcement of deteriorations in credit 
quality seems to be less informative regarding beta after the Lehman Brothers’ default. 
The loss of reputation of CRAs after the crisis began seems to have undermined the 
reliability of these announcements causing that market participants give agency 
actions less credibility.  
In the case of Model 4, simultaneous announcement about issuer rating include 
relevant information to determine the returns, whereas announcements affecting top 
rated financial entities that show a continuous process of deterioration in their credit 
quality are less informative. 
Remarkably, we find important differences between the main attributes that 
contain relevant information to explain the responses of beta risk to negative 
announcement and those that explain the responses of returns. In the latter case, 
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factors as solvency trends, prior rating, the re-rated concept and the sector are 
relevant to determine the probability of informative content.   
5.2. Results for improvements in credit quality   
Table 3 reports the results for positive rating announcements. In this case we 
only estimate three models because, as we mention behind, Model 1 and 2 have the 
same endogenous variable. The pseudo-R2 statistic ranges from 0.33 to 0.43, point to 
higher success of the estimated models than the deterioration models. As well as, the 
proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the estimated models obtain from 
classification tables range from 81% to 89%, which can be considered a fairly good 
result as deterioration models. 
First two columns of Table 3 show the estimated coefficients and the average 
marginal effects to analyze the main attributes that affect the probability that an 
improvement contains relevant information about the risk-return binomial (Model 1). 
As in the case of deteriorations, and according with Altmant and Rijken (2007), rating 
refinements seems to transfer the same relevant information to the market than 
upgrades. Also in this case, our results do not indicate differences in the information 
revealed by the three agencies among agencies, in line to Guettler and Wahrenburg 
(2007). 
[Insert Table 3] 
Rating actions affecting issuers monitored by two agencies seems to contain less 
novelty information than other announcements because the Two agencies variable has 
a significant negative impact on the probability of informative event. The marginal 
27 
 
decrease in this probability is -0.15 points of probability. According to this result, the 
higher the level of firm visibility, the lower the novel information contained by rating 
announcements. However, Highly and Barely covered variables are not significant.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, the degree of agreement among agencies is not 
significant in Model 1. Additionally, we find that announcement included in a positive 
solvency trend of the issuer contains higher levels of relevant information about the 
risk-return binomial. The marginal increase in probability is 0.48 point. This result is 
the opposite to that we find for downgrades, indicating an asymmetric response of 
market to positive and negative news about the credit quality of a firm. This kind of 
asymmetries is commonly found in literature.17  
The likelihood of an informative positive announcement is not related to the 
concept that agencies rated neither if rating has been preceded by a refinement. The 
prior rating affects the probability of informative improvements announcements. We 
observe that positive credit events affecting firms rated in levels A-BBB/Baa increase 
the likelihood of reveal novel information with respect to those affecting firms in the 
other levels. The marginal change in probability is 0.29 points. Regulation seems to 
force institutional investors to be more concerned with debt next the investment-grade 
frontier.  
Our results point to a reputation effect. We find that the size of the jump in the 
rating note affects negatively the likelihood of existence of valuable information in the 
rating improvement. The average marginal decrease in probability is 0.25 points. 
                                                            
17  Ederington and Goh (1998), Hull, Predescu and White (2004) and Abad and Robles (2014). 
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CRAs may delay the announcement of large improvements in the rating note of an 
issue or issuer. They may expend extra-time in the revision of the rating to avoid 
mistakes that can lead to a loss of reputation.  
The likelihood to informative event is also affected by the activity sector of the 
re-rated firm, but in this case, the differential is detected for issuers belonging to the 
Energy sector. Announcements affecting oil-energy firms have a lower likelihood to 
cause a significant response on the risk-return binomial than those affecting firms in 
other sectors. The magnitude of the partial derivatives is high, -0.22 points of 
probability.  
In the case of improvements, financial crisis affect the probability of informative 
rating events. We find that positive announcements dated after the Lehman Brothers' 
default have lower level of relevant information than announcements dated before 
pointing to the loss of reputation of CRAs after the crisis began.  
Summarizing, results for the probability of occurrence of a rating improvement 
that contains relevant information about the risk-return binomial indicate that 
announcement affecting medium-lower rated firms that present a positive trend in 
solvency reveal higher levels of relevant information, whereas those announced before 
the crisis beginning, affecting energy firms, covered by two agencies, that imply a big 
improvement in the rating note reveal lower levels of novel information to the market. 
Model 3 in Table 3 consider as dependent variable the probability of occurrence 
of a rating improvement that discloses relevant information to determine the 
systematic risk. The number of significant attributes is higher than those in Models 
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1(2) and 4 and includes those detected in Model 1(2). In this case, announcements 
affecting highly covered firms in terms of the frequency of events and the number of 
CRAs include lower levels of relevant information whereas this level is higher for 
improvements announced simultaneously or by a second mover. In contrast to 
downgrades, in this case the presence of a prior refinement makes the upgrade more 
informative, according to Boot et al. (2006) hypothesis.     
When we analyze the probability of occurrence of a positive announcement that 
reveals important information regarding returns (Model 4), we observe that those 
rating improvements disclosed by S&P are less informative with respect to the other 
agencies. In this case, the agreement among agencies does not influence the probability 
whereas if the improvement breaks a negative trend increases the level of relevant 
information. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The latest financial crisis has stressed the need of knowing the role that CRAs 
play in the financial system. This paper focuses on their function as information 
providers by analyzing the Informational Content Hypothesis of different credit rating 
actions announced by the three biggest global agencies in a sample of Spanish firms 
from 2000 to 2010. We analyze the joint reaction of the stock risk-return binomial to 
rating changes, previously unexplored.  
We establish a wide set of hypothesis about the expected informative content of 
different types of announcements looking for the main features of the rating action, the 
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agency, the re-rated firm and the economic environment to identify which rating 
events reveals more relevant information to determine the response of the risk-return 
binomial.  
Some relevant insights emerge from the analysis. In line to the literature, we 
find important asymmetries between positive and negative announcement. The main 
attributes of informative rating actions are different depending on whether agencies 
announce an improvement in credit quality or whether they announce deterioration. 
We also find that the main attributes of rating events that are relevant to explain the 
response of systematic risk differs from those relevant to explain the response of 
returns. 
Our results point to the existence of a loss of reputation of CRAs in the later 
financial turmoil, since we find that after the crisis beginning, positive and negative 
credit rating announcement disclose less relevant information.  
We find that factors related to the existence of trends in the solvency of the 
firm (successive rating actions in the same direction), the presence of a prior 
refinement and the rating prior the announcement affect the probability of informative 
rating event positively in the case of improvements and negatively for deteriorations. 
The size of the movement in the rating note has the opposite impact, increasing the 
information content of downgrades and decreasing it for upgrades. 
Conversely, for positive and negative announcement factors related to the 
visibility of the firm as the number of CRAs that rate the firms or if they operate in a 
strategic sector decrease the probability of informative events. Factors related to 
coincidence of opinion among agencies increase this probability. 
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Finally, in the case of negative rating events, the announcement reveal more 
relevant information if it refers to the issuer, whereas for positive rating events the 
rated concept is not important. For positive events the releasing agency is relevant, 
being Standards and Poor’s the less informative.  
To conclude, we consider that those results are important because they can 
serve to identify the main features of the rating announcement relevant to understand 
the changes in the risk-return profile of the firm caused by the rating event, helping 
investors to improve their investment decisions. It is important to remark that we 
analyze the Spanish case, a medium-size European market, and is not possible to 
generalize our main conclusions. To do that it is necessary to provide more 
international in larger markets as the US or the Euro area. 
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Table 1. Sample description 
Panel A: Distribution per year 
Year Positives Negatives Total #Firms  
2000 10 13 23 12  
2001 6 22 28 15  
2002 7 34 41 21  
2003 16 17 33 21  
2004 11 5 16 12  
2005 11 15 26 17  
2006 7 17 24 16  
2007 12 10 22 11  
2008 8 19 27 16  
2009 1 32 33 20  
2010 2 17 19 13  
Panel B: Distribution per rating action and agency  
 Fitch Moodys S&P Total  
Downgrade 37 38 25 100  
Neg. Outlook 5 16 9 30  
Neg. Review 20 32 19 71  
Upgrade 11 24 14 49  
Pos. Outlook 6 17 10 33  
Pos. Review 3 4 2 9  
Total 82 131 79 292  
Panel C: Distribution per prior rating  
Rating Positives Negatives Total #Firms  
AAA  12 12 9  
AA 22 56 78 20  
A 44 91 135 24  
BBB 23 30 53 14  
BB 1 6 7 4  
B  3 3 3  
CCC  1 1 1  
CC  2 2 1  
C 1  1 1  
Panel D: Distribution per sector  
Sector Positives Negatives Total #Firms  
Other 12 65 77 9  
Oil and Energy 20 77 97 12  
Financials 59 59 118 12  
Total 91 201 292 33  
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Table 2. Determinants of ICH: deteriorations 
  Model 1     Model 2    Model 3       Model 4 
Coef AME Coef AME Coef AME Coef AME 
Review 0.079 - -0.684 - -0.052 - -0.691 - 
Outlook report 0.637 - 0.081 - 0.371 - -0.519 - 
Moody’s -0.639 - -0.422 - -0.337 - -0.249 - 
S&P -0.470 - -0.084 - -0.490 - 0.025 - 
Two agencies -1.523 -0.127b -1.280 -0.119c -2.161b -0.338a -0.396 - 
Three agencies -1.214 - -1.255 - -1.455 - 0.122 - 
Highly covered 0.869 - 0.689 - 0.349 - -0.151 - 
Barely covered 1.370 - 0.929 - 0.882 - 0.579 - 
Simultaneous 0.480 - 1.065c 0.151 0.868c 0.177c 0.998c 0.208c 
Split-rating -0.077 - -0.101 - -0.284 - -0.423 - 
Second mover 0.029 - 0.470 - -0.144 - 0.297 - 
Trend rating -1.157 - -1.308 -0.118c 0.560 - -1.114 -0.176c 
Break trend 0.680 - 0.581 - -0.136 - -0.116 - 
Prior refinement -0.579 - -1.083 -0.106c 0.052 - -0.801 - 
Multiple -0.200 - -0.450 - -0.125 - -0.266 - 
Issuer 2.649c 0.449 2.522 - 1.212 - 1.809c 0.383c 
AAA/Aaa -1.856 -0.116b -1.821 -0.124c -1.269 - -1.574 -0.205b 
AA/Aa 0.060 - 0.284 - 0.183 - 0.157 - 
A – BBB/Baa 0.357 - 0.364 - 0.575 - -0.096 - 
Speculative -0.699 - -0.585 - -1.306 -0.222c 0.243 - 
Jump 0.933b 0.101b 0.782c 0.089c 0.456 - 0.457 - 
Financial sector -1.582c -0.131a -1.700c -0.149a -0.556 - -0.852 -0.143c 
Financial crisis 0.186 - 0.251 - -0.791 -0.156c 0.611 - 
Volatility -493.5 - -172.8 - -1011.4 - 1135.9 - 
Constant -1.039 -0.571 1.105 -0.645 
% Accuarte 86.9% 85.9% 66.8% 72.40% 
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.143 0.138 0.084 
Note: Sample from 01:2000 to 12:2010. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dichotomous variable 
in Model 1 (Model 2) is regards to occurrence of an informative rating action in risk-return (beta-return) binomial. The 
dichotomous variable in Model 3 (Model 4) is regards to beta risk (return). AME is the average marginal effect. Review (Outlook 
reports) is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action is a watchlisting (outlook review) and zero otherwise. Moody’s 
(S&P) is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action is announced by Moody’s (S&P) and zero otherwise. Two (Three) 
agencies is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the issuer is rate by two (three) CRAs. Highly (barely) covered is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is in the first (fourth) quartile of issuer ranking regards to number of rating actions in 
the sample. Simultaneous is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action has been announced by two or more agencies the 
same day and zero otherwise. Split-rating is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action follows an action by other agency 
in the opposite direction in the preceding 3 months and zero otherwise. Second mover is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
rating action follows an action by other agency in the same direction in the preceding 24 months and zero otherwise. Trend rating 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action has been preceded by one rating announcements in the same direction over 
the past 24 months and zero otherwise. Break trend is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action has been preceded by 
two rating announcements in the opposite direction and zero otherwise. Prior refinement is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
rating action has been preceded by a watch listing or review and zero in otherwise. Multiple is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the rating action affects different kinds of debt. Issuer is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating events are related to issuer 
solvency and zero otherwise. Prior rating is encoding the rating categories of the previous rating of the issuer, assigning value 1 to 
AAA, 2 to AA, 3 to A, 4 to BBB, … and 10 to D. Speculative is a dummy variable equal to one if the prior rating of the firm is 
from 5 to 10 and zero otherwise. Jump is a variable equal to the jump between the prior rating and new rating. Financial 
(Energy) Sector is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating action involves financial (oil) sector firms and zero otherwise. 
Financial crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if the event occurs after September, 15 2008 and zero otherwise. Volatility is a 
ratio between the volatility of the market and volatility of the issuer in the event window.  
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Table 3. Determinants of ICH: improvements 
Model 1 (2) Model 3 Model 4 
Coef AME Coef AME Coef AME 
Review -3.106 - 0.231 - 0.255 - 
Outlook report -2.646 - 1.282 - -1.408 - 
Moody’s 1.145 - 1.571 - 1.264 - 
S&P -1.297 - -1.229 - -1.605 -0.167c 
Two agencies -3.421 -0.153c -2.015 - -1.339 - 
Three agencies -18.902 - -2.728 -0.347c -2.138 -0.269c 
Highly covered 12.967 - -1.999c -0.237b 0.346 - 
Barely covered -16.099 - -15.941 - -1.623 - 
Simultaneous 1.931 - 4.033a 0.491a 0.928 - 
Second mover 1.863 - 3.451a 0.428a 0.875 - 
Trend rating 5.419b 0.482a 5.175b 0.540a 3.822b 0.479a 
Break trend 1.371 - 0.794 - 2.321b 0.301b 
Prior refinement 2.451 - 3.391b 0.379a 2.325c 0.276c 
Multiple 0.700 - -0.796 - 0.835 - 
AA/Aa 1.227 - 1.322 - 0.517 - 
A – BBB/Baa 3.697b 0.293b 3.143b 0.355b 2.516c 0.289c 
Jump -3.746 -0.251b -1.981 -0.213c -1.073 - 
Energy sector -3.959c -0.218ª -2.905b -0.272a -3.802b -0.301a 
Financial crisis -3.559c -0.161ª -1.794 -0.170c -4.024b -0.272a 
Volatility 7.516 - 7.176 - 2.009 - 
Constant 4.039 0.526 -0.322 
% Accuarte 89.4% 84.7% 81.2% 
Pseudo R2 0.429 0.402 0.338 
See note Table 2 
 
